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2Abstract. Although the impact of neurodegenerative diseases on everyday life interactions is 
well known in the literature, their impact on social cognition processes remains unclear. The 
concept of social cognition refers to a set of skills, all of which are essential to live in a group. 
It involves social knowledge, perception and processing of social cues, and the representation 
of mental states. This article reviews recent findings on the impact of cortical and subcortical 
neurodegenerative diseases on three social cognitive processes, namely theory of mind, 
empathy and emotional processing. We focus on a conceptual approach to each of these skills 
and their cerebral underpinning. 
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Social cognition: definition 
Human relationships require adaptation to others by the intervention of socio-cognitive 
and emotional processes to regulate the behavior in the interaction. These processes represent 
the field of research of social cognition, which is of growing interest in the scientific 
literature. In recent decades, studies in social neuroscience have particularly developed, 
especially after the 2000s (Figure 1). 
This enthusiasm is not surprising considering that social relationships are at the heart 
of human activity and that some behavioral disorders demonstrated by brain-damaged patients 
are likely to be explained by an impairment of social cognition processes.
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Figure 1: Number of articles in Pubmed containing “social cognition” in their titles 
between 1967 and 2017. 
Most of this research has focused on the definition of the cognitive architecture of 
social cognition processes, their dissociation and their relationship with other components 
(e.g. executive functions). Most results tend to show that a deficit in social cognition always 
leads to a behavioral disorder in neurological [1] or psychiatric diseases [2].   
Social cognition includes all the socio-emotional capacities that enable the monitoring of 
behavior in an interaction situation. In our view, Frith’s [3] definition of social cognition 
brings together most of these key points: “Social cognition concerns the various 
psychological processes that enable individuals to take advantage of being part of a social 
group. Of major importance to social cognition are the various social signals that enable us 
to learn about the world.” (Frith, 2008, p. 2033).
4According to this definition, social cognition is composed of several different concepts. 
Theory of mind, empathy and emotional regulation seem to be the most studied in the 
literature. 
Theory of mind
There is no consensus about the definition of Theory of Mind (TOM) in the literature. 
Some authors see it as the ability to access the mental states of others, whereas others define it 
as the ability to adopt the point of view of others [4]. In neuropsychology, although the term 
TOM refers to several meanings, it is generally considered to represent the meta-cognitive 
abilities that facilitate the implementation of social interactions. These meta-representational 
capacities are enabled by an inference system leading to the attribution of mental states such 
as thoughts, intentions, beliefs or feelings.
Several dissociations of the components of TOM are available. A major one refers to 
automatic and controlled processes and echoes the proposals of Sabbagh et al. [5] and 
Apperly and Butterfill [6]. Automatic processes are considered as rapid and not necessarily 
requiring language, in contrast to controlled processes, which are slower and effortful [7,8]. In 
this review, we focus only on controlled processes.
 Another dissociation was defined by Coricelli [9] who distinguished cognitive TOM, 
i.e. making inferences about the epistemic mental states of others without emotional 
involvement, from emotional TOM, which defines empathy as the cognitive ability needed to 
understand the emotional feelings of others (see below).
Concerning the neuroanatomical substrates thought to underlie the TOM process, they 
have been the subject of numerous works and are still being debated (see [10,11] for a 
review), but it seems possible to identify the brain structures frequently mentioned in these 
5studies, classified into three groups. The first refers to the limbic and para-limbic regions, 
which include the orbitofrontal cortex, the amygdala and the anterior cingulate gyrus. These 
regions underpin the skills associated with the emotional side of TOM [12]. Stone et al. [13] 
confirmed these results, showing that patients affected in the frontal-orbital regions were less 
efficient than patients with dorsolateral frontal lesions in a “faux pas” task [13] requiring 
emotional responses. However, these patients were able to verbalize the emotional states or 
beliefs of the protagonists, unlike patients with dorsolateral lesions. Thus, this meta-
representational aspect, comparable to the cognitive side of TOM, seems to depend more on 
dorsolateral prefrontal structures [9]. The second group involves the medial prefrontal 
regions. Gallagher et al. [14] reported the activation of the medial frontal gyrus only when 
processing designs requires the mobilization of cognitive TOM abilities (answers regarding 
the beliefs or intentions of protagonists) compared to neutral designs (see also [15]). The third 
group involves the posterior brain regions that include the right posterior parietal system and, 
in particular, the inferior parietal lobule and the right superior temporal sulcus and the 
temporal poles. Although there is a consensus about most of these neuroanatomical substrates, 
there are very contrasting views in the literature about one area. Many authors agree that the 
temporoparietal junction (TPJ) is involved in TOM, but there is debate about the 
lateralization. Based on case studies or meta-analysis, authors cannot agree whether the right 
TPJ [16–18] or the left TPJ [19–21] is essential for TOM. There is clearly a need for further 
studies on this topic. 
In short, functional imaging data tend to confirm the dissociation between cognitive 
and affective TOM: the cognitive side of TOM is supported by the dorsomedial and 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex while the emotional side is supported by the ventromedial and 
orbital frontal regions. [22]. More recently, it has been proposed that the dorsal striatum, the 
dorsal temporal pole and the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex underlie the cognitive TOM 
6network, whereas the ventral striatum, amygdala, ventral temporal pole and the ventral 
anterior cingulate cortex underpin the affective TOM network [23].
Empathy
Empathy specifically refers to the process of developing inferences about the 
emotional states of others, to share and/or feel their emotions. Decety and Lamm [24] defined 
empathy as the ability to understand what others think, but also to experience it, without 
confusion with oneself. Like TOM, empathy is a process involving several components, 
which has led some authors to distinguish emotional (also referred to as emotional contagion) 
and cognitive empathy [25,26]. Cognitive empathy is defined as the ability to take the 
perspective of others and understand what he/she feels but without experiencing it, while 
affective empathy refers to the ability to feel the emotional states of others. The emotional 
component (low-level process) is directly associated with emotional resonance, a term used to 
define the fact that the observation of an emotion in another person is likely to induce the 
same emotion for the observer by activating identical representation. The cognitive 
component of empathy involves high-level processes such as executive functions (especially 
inhibition), as well as the ability to distinguish oneself from others, to adopt the other’s 
perspective and assign thoughts and emotions [24]. The terms affective TOM and cognitive 
empathy therefore seem to refer to similar concepts [27].
Concerning the neuroanatomical correlates of empathy, the emotional component is 
mainly associated with the mirror neuron system [28], while the cognitive component 
involves the inferior parietal lobule [25]. Some authors have also noted that the neuronal 
activations of cognitive empathy are identical to those of affective TOM and that the brain 
regions recruited during a test with emotional TOM inference are identical to those used 
7during empathy tests [27], thus corroborating the idea that cognitive empathy and affective 
TOM are two overlapping concepts.
Emotional processing and emotional regulation
Because it has a social and a cultural dimension, emotion is a signal that can be used to 
modify the actions of the partner, as well as of the individual him/herself, which was first 
explained by Darwin [29]. The activation of the mirror neuron system when someone sees the 
emotion of another person can induce the same emotion for the observer [30]. 
Humans can detect both “basic” facial expressions and those reflecting complex mental states 
that regulate social interactions (which seem hostile or friendly) or indicate the thoughts of 
others (which seem pensive). Ekman’s work [31] identified seven universal emotions, 
independent of cultural aspects (anger, disgust, joy, neutrality, fear, surprise and sadness). 
Hornak et al. [32] showed the presence of disturbances in the identification of facial and vocal 
emotional expressions in a group of patients who had inadequate social behavior. An 
alteration in the identification of emotional expressions was correlated with the degree of 
change in the subjective emotional feeling evaluated by patients. Moreover, some studies 
have reported a strong positive correlation between this feeling and behavioral problems. 
Thus, the inability to decode emotional expressions seems to harm behavioral control (social 
adjustment, euphoria, irritability) given the fact that emotion then no longer acts as a censor to 
adjust environmental behavior.
Social cognition in pathological aging
Social cognition disorders lead to patients becoming isolated from their relatives as 
well as from the medical staff [4]. A review of the various neurological pathologies that affect 
social cognition therefore seems important in order to study the potential specificity of the 
8deficits according to the pathology. In this section, we report the evolution of the main 
components of social cognition (TOM, empathy and emotion perception) in various cortical 
and subcortical neurodegenerative diseases. In our view, we can hypothesize that 
distinguishing the diseases as a function of their etiologies is interesting due to the fact that it 
is well known that cortical and subcortical diseases lead to several patterns of disorders [33].
Cortical diseases 
Frontotemporal dementias
The behavioral variant of frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD) is the most frequent form 
of frontotemporal dementias (FTDs) [34]. It is characterized by an insidious beginning with a 
gradual evolution reaching first the frontal lobes, causing a change in social and interpersonal 
behaviors. The loss of gray matter mainly occurs in the frontal lobes, specifically in the orbital 
regions (Brodmann area (BA) 10, 11, 47), and the medial and dorsolateral regions (BA 8, 9, 
46), followed by a loss in the temporal lobes [35]. It is also characterized by various changes 
in executive functions and a lack of awareness of deficits (anosognosia) [36,37]. 
As mentioned above, changes in interpersonal behavior can be explained by an impairment of 
social cognition abilities. This has been the subject of a growing number of publications in 
recent years, [38,39] including TOM abilities. To assess these, authors have used a wide range 
of tasks, including faux pas, cartoon tasks and first and second order false belief reasoning 
tasks. The first order refers to the inference made by a person about the mental or belief state 
of a second person in a story, while the second order refers to the participant’s inference about 
the mental state or belief of a first person concerning the inference or belief of a third person. 
Results tend to show a major deficit in first and second order TOM capabilities [40,41] in 
patients with bvFTD, which may explain, at least in part, changes in the relationships of 
patients. For some authors, this TOM deficit is not due to a general cognitive deficit [38,42], 
9but rather to a deficit in inhibiting their own perspective [38], according to the Samson model 
[20] explained earlier. 
Another way to explain the behavioral problems of bvFTD patients could be a 
cognitive and/or affective empathy deficit, which could prevent patients from correctly 
feeling the emotions of others. 
The Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) questionnaire [43,44] seems to be one of the 
most commonly used in the literature to assess empathy [41]. The results of research in this 
field are consistent and show a decline in these abilities on both the cognitive and the 
emotional side [40]. Empathic disorders are considered a diagnostic criterion for this disease 
and could lead to a change in the lives of patients for the decisions and judgments they make. 
From an anatomical point of view, these disorders can be explained by a reduction in gray 
matter in the frontal areas, amygdala region, left insula and the posterior-superior temporal 
sulcus at the TPJ [45,46]. 
Recognition of emotions also appears to be impaired in bvFTD. Using classic 
recognition tasks, such as Ekman’s [31], most studies confirm a deficit for all basic emotions 
[47,48] for these patients compared to control subjects.
To summarize, it seems that all social cognition processes are affected in bvFTD. This set of 
problems leads to the inability of patients to communicate with their families, for which the 
management of social cognition disorders seems essential. It has been shown that, for people 
suffering from a traumatic brain injury [49] or from neurological diseases such as 
schizophrenia [2,50], rehabilitation therapies can have a positive impact on their interactive 
skills and psychosocial abilities. It therefore seems likely that this kind of rehabilitation could 
be suitable for bvFTD patients to try to, at least, stabilize their psychosocial skills. 
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Alzheimer's disease
Alzheimer's disease (AD) is the most common form of dementia. According to the 
Alzheimer’s Disease International Group, in 2015 there were nearly 44 million people living 
with Alzheimer’s disease or related dementia worldwide. AD is characterized mainly by an 
accumulation of amyloid beta proteins, causing the emergence of amyloid plaques, and by 
neurofibrillary degeneration due to the Tau protein. These neuronal damages mainly cause 
hippocampal atrophy in the early stages of the disease, and then spread to the entire cerebral 
cortex. In the literature, many studies report quite controversial results about a potential TOM 
deficit in AD.
Many authors [38,51,52] conclude that there is a TOM deficit in AD, but confined to 
the second order task for false beliefs, while others claim that a memory deficit is responsible, 
especially in working memory in such tasks as they involve a high cognitive load [52]. 
Moreover, according to Samson’s [19,20] model, which locates the inference of the 
perspective of others in the TPJ area, which is damaged early in AD, a deficit in a false belief 
task could be explained by a specific impairment of this capacity. A recent data-mining study 
[53] examined the potential link between scores on executive function (EF) tasks and those on 
TOM tasks in patients with AD. The authors found that around 49% of TOM performance can 
be predicted by EF measures. In other words, according to these authors, it seems that the 
decline in TOM observed by some studies may not be a specific domain decline but rather a 
more general, mainly executive, decline. However, in contrast, some authors [38,42,54] have 
found that despite the impact on EF, AD patients present a pure TOM deficit. More precisely, 
Le Bouc et al. [38] found hypometabolism in the left TPJ, supporting Samson’s [19,20] point 
of view that the TPJ is essential for belief inference. It therefore seems that a TPJ deficit is a 
key point in understanding TOM disorders in patients. 
11
Regarding cognitive and emotional empathy abilities, the results are still very 
divergent in AD. Some authors report a preservation of the capacity for empathy in these 
patients [55] while others obtain opposite results [44,56]. This discrepancy could be explained 
by the inclusion of patients at different stages of severity. 
Studies on emotion detection also show some contradictions. Some report a deficit in 
emotion detection on faces [57,58] while others describe the preservation of this capacity 
[59,60]. However, Burnham's study [59] provides a nuance. In a perception of emotions task, 
AD patients successfully combined the emotion of a face with the corresponding emotion 
written in a list, but were unable to connect two photos with the same emotion. The authors 
therefore concluded that AD patients could potentially have a spared perception of emotions 
but may present visuo-spatial disorders. Furthermore, a recent meta-analysis [61] considered 
that, even when cognitive status is controlled, AD patients always seem impaired in their 
emotion decoding abilities.   
It is thus difficult to conclude that there is a deficit or a preservation of social 
cognition skills in AD. Regarding TOM, the first order tasks are mostly successful in AD 
patients (but see [54]), which means that a part of TOM is spared by the disease. For other 
components of social cognition, it is difficult to draw a conclusion, given that both the tasks 
and the recruitment of patients differ between studies.
Amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS)
Amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), sometimes known as Charcot's disease, is a 
degenerative disease of unknown origin that mainly affects the motor abilities of patients. It 
primarily destroys motor neurons in both the central and peripheral systems [62,63]. In about 
30% of cases it begins in the brain stem, hindering patients from speaking or swallowing, 
whereas for the other 70% it starts with a spinal form, hampering the voluntary movements of 
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the limbs [64]. In all cases, patients end up with general palsy, including of the respiratory 
muscles, obliging them to have heavy equipment. This disease should be differentiated from 
Charcot-Marie-Tooth disease, a genetic disorder that also affects motor function. A Scottish 
study [65] showed that 35% of patients appear to suffer from language disorders, and 23% 
from fluency as well as executive function disorders. In addition, when caregivers were also 
questioned, 40% described patients as undergoing behavioral changes. Despite these deficits 
making the evaluation more complex, research studies began a few years ago [63] and have 
hugely increased in recent years [66,67] (see [68] for a review).
Concerning the theory of mind, studies using the RME [69] or the faux pas [13] test 
found a significant difference between dysexecutive patients with ALS and control subjects 
[66,67,70]. However, these results have led to debate. Some authors report that this difference 
cannot be found when ALS patients without executive disorder are compared with control 
subjects [66,67,71], whereas others find that this difference persists when executive scores are 
entered as covariate [71] (see [68] for a review). These results are highly interesting for the 
debate about the relationship between executive functions and TOM [72,73]. 
Regarding the empathic capacity of ALS patients, studies are relatively rare, or even 
absent from a recent meta-analysis on social cognition and ALS [68]. To our knowledge, only 
one study has examined it [71]. In this research, ALS patients (20% with executive 
dysfunction) had to attribute emotions to comic strips. The results showed a significantly 
lower score for ALS patients compared to control subjects. Facial recognition with Ekman’s 
task [31] seemed to be affected too in ALS patients compared to controls [74,75] (see [68] for 
a review). Concerning prosody emotion recognition, the studies are both rare and 
heterogeneous with one reporting a deficit [76] and one nothing [74]. 
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To sum up, it seems difficult to draw a conclusion about the possible impact of ALS 
on social cognition skills. For TOM, although it appears to be affected, there is still debate 
about the impact of the executive dysfunction. Concerning the other components, the lack of 
research results prevents a conclusion. 
Subcortical diseases 
Parkinson’s disease
Parkinson's disease (PD) is caused by the degeneration of dopaminergic neurons in the 
substantia nigra, striatum, thalamus and subthalamic nucleus, which leads to frontal-striatal 
loops [77]. From a neuropsychological point of view, a large variety of disorders is observed. 
However, it seems that the majority of patients show executive disorders [78] and that at least 
80% of patients suffer from dementia late in the disease progression [79]. Beyond motor 
disorders that massively hamper patients' lives, some studies have shown behavioral and 
psycho-emotional changes, such as depression, apathy or anxiety [80].
Studies on TOM disorders agree that there is a deficit in TOM in non-demented PD 
patients [72,81,82]. Like for TOM, there is a consensus in the literature about impaired 
empathy skills among PD patients in the early stages of the disease [83]. From an anatomical 
point of view, the deterioration of TOM and empathy in PD patients seems inevitable due to 
the damage of frontal striatal loops and amygdala [84]. 
Most studies on the recognition of emotions report a deficit in PD, but not all agree 
about an overall impairment. In many studies, not all emotions seem to be recognized. For 
example, Assogna et al. [85] reported a circumscribed deficit in the recognition of disgust and 
a preservation for other emotions, while Lawrence et al. [86] found only a lack in the 
recognition of anger. A meta-analysis of emotion recognition in PD [87] concluded that only a 
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certain proportion of patients seems to have an emotion recognition disorder, mainly for 
negative emotions and especially for disgust. According to these results, in a sample of people 
in which half are PD patients and half are healthy then statistically 63% of patients will have 
an emotion recognition disorder versus 37% for controls. The authors warn that emotion 
recognition has high inter-individual variability. Regarding the recognition of emotions 
through language, a meta-analysis [88] concluded there was a prosody recognition deficit in 
PD patients.
A recent study [89] found a link between the facial emotion deficit and apathy in PD patients. 
Another found an overall deficit without a link to general cognitive abilities [90]. 
In summary, it seems that most studies find social cognition deficits in PD patients 
with the exception of Rosen’s study [91].
Huntington's disease
Huntington's disease (HD) is a neurodegenerative pathology [92] with a genetic origin, 
resulting in physical and intellectual harm. Patient disorders are characterized mainly by 
physical impairment with the occurrence of involuntary, rapid and irregular movements 
(chorea) between 35 and 50 years old. Cerebral involvement of HD is characterized by a 
decrease in the volume of subcortical regions (the putamen and caudate nucleus), striatum and 
cortical regions, progressing from the temporal lobes to the frontal lobes [93].
Allain et al. [94] showed that beyond the executive disorders, frontal lobe involvement 
in HD also provoked social cognition disorders. In their paper, the authors focused on TOM 
disorders using both a non-verbal assignment of intentions and Baron-Cohen's “Reading the 
Mind in the Eyes” test [69]. The task assigning intentions consisted of 56 small cartoons, half 
requiring inference of the intentions of the characters, the other half requiring understanding 
of physical causal relationships. The participants were instructed to choose an image in order 
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to complete the sequence. To do this, they had to infer the intentions of the characters with 
simple and realistic first-order intentions [95]. The RME consisted of 36 photographs of the 
eye region of different actors. Participants had to find which of five words (hatred, panic, 
guilt, reflection and admiration) best described what the person in the photo was thinking 
about. This task requires participants to put themselves in the person's place in the photograph 
while assigning them complex mental states.
The results showed a significant decrease in the performance of HD participants in 
both trials compared to a group of elderly controls [94]. This decrease reflects a deficit in both 
the cognitive dimension (attribution of intentions) and the emotional dimension (reading 
emotions in the gaze) of TOM. Several other studies have shown that performances in TOM 
tasks in patients with HD are reduced (see [96] for a review). Adjeroud et al. [95] measured 
the performance of TOM in pre-symptomatic and symptomatic stages. The originality of their 
study was the use of a modified version of the French “Yoni” test [97] evaluating emotional 
and cognitive TOM in 1st and 2nd order, with a control condition. Symptomatic patients had 
difficulty in inferring mental states in 1st and 2nd order, affective and cognitive dimensions, 
while pre-symptomatic patients presented performances similar to controls. In addition, the 
authors found no correlation between TOM and executive functions. A meta-analysis [98] 
also showed cognitive and affective TOM deficits in symptomatic patients, the latter having 
more difficulty than pre-symptomatic patients. In the pre-symptomatic stage of the disease, a 
high probability of motor symptoms in the first 5 years is associated with a greater deficit in 
TOM, suggesting that performance in social cognition could be a marker of disease 
progression. 
Empathy, assessed by the Interpersonal Reactivity Index [43] or empathy scale [99], 
seems preserved in HD [73], but only a few studies have assessed it. Trinkler et al. [100] also 
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showed that patients with HD had an intact understanding of their own feelings and were able 
to infer the feelings of others in an empathy test.
Impaired emotion recognition is highlighted in patients with HD at the pre-
symptomatic stage [98,101]. The meta-analysis of Bora et al. [98] shows that the recognition 
of six basic emotions is impaired in these patients, including anger, disgust and fear. 
Symptomatic patients are more affected than pre-symptomatic patients. Evaluation methods 
of emotion recognition included photographs of faces, emotion hexagons, short videos and 
vocal sounds, showing that impaired emotion recognition concerns not only facial expressions 
but also body gestures and emotional prosody [102].
In summary, patients with HD appear to undergo alterations in the cognitive and 
affective dimensions of TOM as well as in the perception of emotions, whereas empathy 
seems to be preserved.
Multiple sclerosis (MS) 
Multiple sclerosis is an autoimmune inflammatory disease affecting the myelin sheath 
of the central nervous system, white matter and gray matter [103]. It affects a large number of 
cerebral regions without following a typical pattern of progression [104], leading to a large 
number of cognitive deficits [105–107]. The quality of life tests show particularly low scores 
for MS [108], so it seems important to explain which variables are responsible for these 
problems. Although motor problems clearly play a preponderant role, some cognitive 
variables, such as social cognition, also seem to be involved [109]. 
Among the social cognition functions, TOM seems to present a deficit when evaluated 
with the RME [110], the faux pas test [111] or movies [112].
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Regarding empathy, patients also appear to have a significant deficit in both cognitive 
and emotional empathy [87, 88]. However, some authors [111] have shown that at the onset 
of the disease, patients describe themselves as more empathic than the average. This deficit 
could be explained by anosognosia, a deficit that appears to be present in a large proportion of 
patients [114]. In relation to empathy, the majority of studies in patients with MS appear to 
show a deficit in emotion recognition [107,113,114]. However, it should be pointed out that, 
according to some authors, this lack of emotional recognition is not generalized to all 
emotions, but rather to anger and fear [110].
In conclusion, it seems that all three main components of social cognition are impaired 
in MS. In addition to the motor syndrome, this deficit could explain the poor quality of life 
reported by patients [108]. 
 Conclusion
The aim of this article was to present the definitions of the most studied social 
cognition processes, their main cerebral foundations and, above all, the effects of cortical and 
subcortical neurodegenerative diseases on the main social cognition skills.
Our literature review shows that there is sometimes a close relationship between the different 
processes of social cognition, both for their definitions that may overlap and for the cerebral 
structures that underlie them. This work also provides a better understanding of the links 
between social cognitive skills and other cognitive skills, mainly including executive 
functions. Nevertheless, several points need to be raised. Firstly, while data relating to social 
cognition seem important for some pathologies, mainly schizophrenia and autism [2,115–
117], there is significantly less research for other disorders, particularly neurodegenerative 
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diseases. Secondly, while many authors associate social cognition with the ability to behave 
appropriately in a situation of interaction, few studies have validated this proposition. 
According to the different studies, it seems that social cognition processes are 
affected, at least in part, in cortical and subcortical neurodegenerative diseases and that in 
every disease mentioned, at least one process is affected. So, contrary to our expectation, 
there is no difference between a cortical and a subcortical etiology in terms of social cognition 
deficit. This absence of difference could be explained by the extent of the pathology at the 
time of the examination. The comparison between different diseases on objective measures 
being often complex. For example, the studies of Ramanan et al., (2016) [73] and Gregory et 
al., (2002) [52], studying TOM with FTD patients,  seem to present some dissonance in the 
population. The first one have patients aged in average of 65.25 years old compared to 58.6 
years old for the second one. The most important difference is that of MMSE passing from 
24.47 to 26.66. It’s possible to imagine that this difference could account to explain the 
relative heterogeneity between studies. This difference, beyond a change in the 
neuropsychological examination, could also have an impact on the brain.  
For example, although AD and PD have two different etiologies (cortical and subcortical, 
respectively), in the end they will both reach the frontal lobe, often defined as a major lobe for 
social cognition. So, this etiological dissociation does not seem to be the most appropriate to 
analyze social cognition disorders. A classification based on the locus of a pathology does not 
seem appropriate either, since social cognition appears to have a wide range of neuronal 
bases. It may be that focusing on problems of everyday life functioning would be more 
relevant to distinguish patients. Moreover, the links between social cognition skills and 
personality or behavioral disorders remain to be explored in neurodegenerative diseases to 
understand whether the disturbances in social cognition processes could account for 
behavioral regulation deficits in interaction situations.
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One way of examining the relationships between socio-cognitive disturbances and 
behavioral disorders in social interactions is through questionnaires. An alternative would be 
to think of new methodologies for evaluating social cognition that could assess the ability of 
subjects to analyze real interaction situations. However, most studies of social cognition 
processes involve classic tests or functional imaging paradigms. These are non-ecological 
situations, which, by definition, limit the possibilities of actually assessing the processes at 
work in social interactions. The methods put forward by Stuss et al. [118] or Freedman et al. 
[42] that involve taking a visual perspective or the detection of deception could, from this 
point of view, constitute a more original approach. A methodology combining social 
psychology and neuropsychology could also be more relevant for the emergence of a genuine 
social neuropsychology. An alternative could be the use of the interactionist approach [119–
121], which considers that, to test social cognition processes, people need to interact with 
other people. In contrast to the other tests, which are often not ecological, this approach aims 
to assess processes as close as possible to everyday life situations. 
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